

# **BEST FRIENDS OR WORST ENEMIES?**

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**#1** MOTIVATION

# MOTIVATION PROBLEM SCOPE

### Security is essential for the automotive development.

- Safety is only dependable, when the right Security is present.
- Regulations, like UN ECE R155, require Security to be considered.

### Usability?

- Does Security slow down the development process?
- How transparently can Security be integrated?
- Application communication vs. Security?

## We will focus on Network Security.







# MOTIVATION MODEL

### Structure of ECU

- The SW architecture of an ECU is "somewhat" layered.
- Layering mainly for data but not for control present.
- Optimization: remove or combine layers.

### **Important Aspects**

- Stack signals to applications when to communicate.
- Most common: Ethernet Link up / Interface comes up.
- Also: SOME/IP-SD, connections ready, etc.
- Security may be integrated into different layers.







# #2 SECURITY PROTOCOLS EXAMINED

# **SECURITY PROTOCOLS EXAMINED** TLS/DTLS IN GENERAL (NON-AUTOMOTIVE)

- TLS is "typically" implemented as an application library.
- Instead of sockets, you get secured sockets (Secure Socket Layer, SSL).
- First usage: Webserver and browser.
- Application is fully aware of TLS or DTLS and controls it.
- Typically, by preferences/config or for "https" per URL.
- You may bind the server application only to "secure sockets".
- However, a compromised application can still communicate unsecure.
- Firewalling and IDS/IPS try to cope with that.
- Designed for Internet and not so much for local network.





# **SECURITY PROTOCOLS EXAMINED** TLS/DTLS IN AUTOMOTIVE

### **SOME/IP Middleware abstracts stack/complexity**

- SOME/IP sets up data path before telling App to start:
- For UDP: no explicit setup required.
- For TCP: Client opens TCP connection to Server first.
- What happens, when you add TLS/DTLS?
- Adding TLS slows down the establishment of TCP connections.
- However, adding DTLS changes a lot:
  - DTLS needs to secure the "connection" first, SOME/IP-SD does not wait.
  - Applications start to send unsecured data into DTLS handshake...
  - DLTS needs to be handled like TCP and not UDP (stacks missed this)!
- Lesson Learned: It is non-trivial to make Security transparent!





Simplified SOME/IP Client Flow

# **SECURITY PROTOCOLS EXAMINED** IPSEC IN GENERAL (NON-AUTOMOTIVE)

- IPsec is often used for VPNs.
- Typically, part of the stack/operating system.
- Often as "secure tunneling" of IP communication.
- IPsec matches traffic (like firewalling) and "protects" it.
  - Example: All traffic to Corporate Headquarters go via VPN.
- Applications are (typically) not aware of IPsec.
- The goal is to hide it from the user to ease usage.
- Firewalling and network design stop communication, when VPN tunnel stops.
- Designed for Internet and not so much for local network.





## **SECURITY PROTOCOLS EXAMINED** IPSEC AND APPLICATIONS

### **IPsec and Firewalling hide inside TCP/IP stack**

- IPsec protection is based on Security Policy (~firewalling).
- For example: protect traffic to Destination IP 1.2.3.4 and port 12345/udp.
- SOME/IP stacks and IPsec start in parallel. Peers might be late.
- What can go wrong?
- Surprise: SOME/IP and IPsec need to communicate.
- Does this communication require IPsec? Ready to do so?
- IPsec standard does not really explain this.
- SOME/IP Endpoints may determine which traffic must be protected, i.e., based on port ranges.
- Lesson Learned: Security standard does not discuss these issues.





# **SECURITY PROTOCOLS EXAMINED** LESSON LEARNED.



### What did we learn so far?

- Security protocols (like TLS/DTLS, IPsec) are not as transparent as expected.
- When ignoring that, things can really go wrong.

### **Discussion**:

- Start to communicate as early as possible?
- Start to communicate after Security is ready?
- When using SOME/IP Middleware, these issues and complexity can be hidden.
- What happens with communication besides SOME/IP (e.g., NM, DoIP, ...)?



# **#3** HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?

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# **HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?** HELP THE APPLICATION DEVELOPERS

### **Divide and Conquer.**

- Most application developers are no experts in secure communication.
- Goal: hide the security without reducing the security.
- Let the application developers focus on their work.
- Strategy:
  - Do not create special security APIs towards applications!
  - Let the integrator and security/communication developers worry about security.
  - Align security and communication with standardized APIs.
  - Create solutions which are capable of updates to foster innovation.
    - Secure the platform and not only individual use cases.





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# HOW CAN WE IMPROVE? EXAMPLE: MACSEC

### MACsec as the next State-of-the-Art Automotive Network Security solution

- Aligning "MACsec ready" with "Ethernet link up".
- On linkup of physical interface, run MKA but do not signal application.
  - Link up signaled to applications after MKA signals "MACsec ready".
- MACsec configuration via "key installation/diagnostics".
  - Issue for applications? Diagnostics?
- Solution: Use virtual interfaces by creating "unprotected VLANs".







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# **HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?** EXAMPLE: MACSEC (2)

### MACsec as the next State-of-the-Art Automotive Network Security solution

- Low startup performance may require "unsecure communication"
- Solution: Make MACsec so fast that this is not necessary.
- With shared symmetric secret (CAK), we achieved ~14ms<sup>1</sup> startup or faster.



Technica Capture Module 1000 High

- Logging in between both peers with HW Timestamp

<sup>1</sup>using an exemplary external PHY, for other semiconductors this may be different. Detailed information can be found in <u>2021-06-22\_VDI\_CyberSecurityVehicles-DrLarsVoelker\_v.1.0a.pdf</u>





# **HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?** EXAMPLE: AUTOMOTIVE MACSEC

**MKA Client** 

Key Server



# **D**technica

### **Results:**

Туре	Startup <sup>1</sup>	MKA <sup>2</sup>
IT solution (Open Source)	~2000ms	~3000ms
Automotive solution	3-4ms	13-17ms

<sup>1</sup>Startup: Power-in until whenever the port is reachable and sends its first online message.
<sup>2</sup>MKA: first MKA message, until the SAKs are installed and the first MACsec Frame is sent.

### → Automotive MACsec starts so fast that all applications can wait for it!



#4 CONCLUSION

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# **CONCLUSION** LESSON LEARNED

### What did we learn?

- Integrating Security can be very challenging.
- Holistic understanding of stack is essential!
- Protecting the "local network" in a car is non-trivial with TLS/DTLS and IPsec.

### What to do?

- Hide the security from applications. MACsec can help with this.
- Avoid a special "Security API" towards the application.
- MACsec can help you create the secure platform to update later with ease.

### If done right, applications and security protocols are best friends again...











### First Automotive MKA daemon goes Open Source!

#### Where? How? When?

- <u>Technica-Engineering/MKA.SW.Module · GitHub</u>
- GPLv2 licensed.
- Commercial license available.
- Late November 2022.

### What is supported?

- MKA tuned for Automotive Networks.
- Standard APIs compatible with security suites (OpenSSL, WolfSSL, ...).
- Available for Linux based OS.

### Get in touch for more information and updates!





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